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On the Idea of Islamic Feminism 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The object of  this paper is to explore the possibility of defending  
women's rights (or, more broadly, expressing women's concerns) within a 
framework of Islamic concepts and ideas. This is to be accomplished by 
introducing a number of methodological principles  that can, and (for 
feminists) should govern  the practice of "religious interpretation" 
(ijtihad) which Muslims have used throughout the centuries to adapt 
Qur'anic and Islamic teachings to changing realities and circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The object of this paper is to explore the meaning and possibility of 
"Islamic feminism".  The  name itself assumes that Islam and feminism 
are compatible, something which many people will deny immediately.  
But it must be acknowledged that  Islam and feminism  are not simple 
concepts. The terms  are  often understood and explained  in dramatically 
different ways. Thus it is not  a simple matter to prove that one  cannot  
(logically)  be an Islamist and a feminist at the same time, as this would 
require proving that on no possible or thinkable account  of either  term 
can Islam and feminism be combined.  This is a large claim which no 
wise person can profess to be able to prove.  
 
In the course of the present discussion we hope to offer some account, 
however sketchy and programmatic, of how feminist ideas  can be 
accommodated  in the space of  Islamic concepts and ideas.  But first we 
need to explain the motivation for the search for Islamic feminism.  There 
are, in fact, two reasons for  the undertaking. 
 
Firstly, there is a purely theoretical consideration which is suggested by 
the existence of a rich variety of "feminisms" which present themselves 
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as  "progressive" or "revolutionary" inflections of previously existing  
doctrines or systems of thought. We mean to refer to liberal feminism,  
Marxist feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, existentialist feminism, and 
many others besides. Even religion and other ancient "philosophies of the 
spirit", which stand apart  from most of the modern "isms" to which 
feminism gave a progressive  turn, have not managed to escape feminist 
attention. They have been studied and analyzed in search for concepts and 
themes that have relevance to women's liberation and empowerment
1
.  
 
This being so, it stands to reason to explore the theoretical possibility that 
Islam may provide room for a specific variety of feminism to grow in it, 
as it is the case with other theories and views of the world which have 
been "re-thought" by feminism.  
 
Another reason for wanting to explore  the meaning and possibility of 
Islamic feminism is pragmatic in nature.  It has to do with the historical-
cultural realities which must be taken into account if feminism is to take 
root and survive in Arab and/or Islamic societies.  Of course, it is easy 
enough to adopt some "Western-grown" intellectual paradigm, say 
Marxist feminism or liberal feminism, and then use it in order understand, 
and perhaps change the social realities in which men and women live in 
Arab and Islamic countries.  But there is little virtue to be found in this 
procedure. In practice it  has meant little more than the adoption of odd-
sounding terms with no clear equivalent in native languages, which only 
served to emphasize the foreignness of feminist concepts and concerns. 
Besides, it  has meant relinquishing the field of religion to conservative 
thinkers who went on to offer, with little or no opposition, oppressive and 
ill-supported  interpretations of religion. 
 
For this reason is important for us to explore the meaning and possibility 
of a feminism that can be aligned to Islam. This need not mean that all the 
concessions will have to come from the feminist side. Most likely, there 
will have be a degree of dialectical give-and-take, whereby a middle 
ground  position  can be reached,  which can (with some fairness) be 
called "Islamic" and "feminist" at the same time. 
 
How are we to approach the task of formulating a concept of Islamic 
feminism?  In Section II of this paper I shall draw a broad distinction 
between  two approaches to Islam: a liberal-rationalist approach, and a 
                                                        
1 Consider, for example, the idea that “[i]n medieval perspective, female weakness can imitate 
God’s lowering of himself  through the incarnated and suffering Christ.” (Borresen 1995, 
249) 
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conservative-literal approach.  In the process of doing this I shall stop to 
consider the somewhat "progressive" views of  some "modernist" thinkers 
such as Abduh, Amin, Ghazali, and others.  As we shall see, these writers 
are unable to go past certain limits in their advocacy of  women's rights. 
They stop far short of views that can be reasonably be described as 
"feminist". This naturally invites one to think of systematic methods of 
interpretation which are more likely to take us further along the feminist 
path.   
 
In Section III and the following sections I  argue that Islamic feminism 
can be realized within the framework of a liberal-rationalist view of 
Islam. This is to be accomplished by introducing a number of 
methodological principles  that can, and (for feminists) should govern  the 
practice of "religious interpretation" (ijtihad) which Muslims have used 
throughout the centuries to adapt Qur'anic and Islamic teachings to 
changing realities and circumstances.   
 
The principles in question, which are three in number, sound plausible on 
any reasonably enlightened view of Islam.  Should they be accepted, they  
would  not only contribute to the elaboration of an "Islamic feminism", 
but they could also be used to argue that Islam is not a "lost cause" as far 
as feminism is concerned, that there is something to be gained from 
standing on religious ground in order to contest traditionalist and 
patriarchal interpretations of the faith. 
 
 
II. Islamic Models   
 
Great religious traditions are invariably complex and rich, which makes it 
possible for one  to view them along many dimensions. Islam is no 
exception.  One can view it along a historical dimension, and thus 
distinguish between an "early Islam" and later  historical stages, however 
these are defined.   Or one can view Islam along the dimension of living 
practice, and thus distinguish between different ways in which Islam is 
experienced and practiced by different denominations (Sunni vs. Shi'ite 
Islam, for example), in different social-economic settings (rural vs. urban 
Islam), or  by ethnically diverse  communities (Indian vs. North African 
Islam).   
 
There is, however one additional dimension along which Islam can be 
considered which is of  special interest to us in this paper.  There may be 
more than way of referring to this dimension and the distinctions that are 
to be made under it. For want of a more suitable term I shall use "the 
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intellectual dimension" to refer to the intellectual attitude with which one 
can approach Islam.  Thus one may choose to emphasize the character of 
Islam as a revealed religion, or  one may choose to emphasize the 
rational character of Islam. (The interplay between reason and revelation 
is a constant theme in all religions, and Islam is no exception in this 
regard.) One may view Islam in liberal fashion, or in a conservative 
manner. One may view Islamic texts literally,  or one may choose to 
exercise  a certain freedom of interpretation.  Finally, one may view 
Islam as a way of life which is open to development and change,  or one 
may view it as an unchanging tradition. 
 
The "intellectual attitude" with Islam can be approached is not a tidy 
concept, nor are the distinctions that are made with its help crystal clear. 
But despite this relative lack of tidiness and clarity, it must be 
acknowledged that we are dealing with alternatives and possible methods 
for considering Islam that have considerable antiquity. In fact, they go as 
far back as the 8
th
 century, which witnessed the beginnings of the 
Mu'tazilite school of theology. The Mu'tazilites  advocated  a "rationalist" 
interpretation of Islam, which led them to be believe in divine justice and 
freedom of the will, and  to offer non-literal interpretation of 
anthropomorphic verses in the Qur'an.  
 
For a long time after the Mu'tazilite movement, rationalist interpretations 
of Islam were rarely visible or influential (The school of Averroes [1198]  
being the most noteworthy exception to this).  However, beginning with 
the period of "Arab Renaissance" in latter part of the 19
th
 century, and 
due (in part) to influences emanating from the West, Arab and Muslim 
thinkers began to feel their way back to enlightened, rationalist 
interpretations of the faith, interpretations which could  pave the way for 
Muslims to find their place among the "advanced" nations of the modern 
world.  
 
Not surprisingly, it is among  the "modernizing" Muslim thinkers of late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
  centuries that we find  first signs of  recognition of 
women's rights, and  the first calls for  the removal of the injustices under 
which they labored for ages. Prominent examples  of such thinkers are 
Muhammad Abduh,  Qasim Amin, and  al-Taher al-Haddad.   
 
According to Barbara Stowasser, the modernists relied on a distinction 
between two aspects of Islamic life: religious observances ('ibadat, how 
one worships God) and social transactions (mu'amalat, conduct of 
worldly affairs) (Stowasser, 1993, 8).  Confession of the Islamic creed, 
prayer,  and pilgrimage  are examples of  'ibadat.   They may be viewed 
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as "religious duties" which  must be fulfilled without rational inquiry as 
to  the meanings, purposes, or rationale of the divine will.  On the other 
hand, marriage, inheritance, the conduct of politics, economic activity,  
and the waging of war, are examples of mu'amalat . In these areas and 
others like them, believers are permitted to exercise reason and practical 
wisdom to the extent that this does not violate explicit divine commands, 
or the spirit of the message embodied in revelation.  
 
Stowasser  also draws attention to yet another concept which played an 
important role in advancing the discussion of women's rights:  the 
concept of "the public interest", or "common weal" (al-maslaha). 
(Stowasser 1993,  10, 13). In practical terms, this means  that believers 
have a duty to conduct  their lives in  ways that  serve  the social well-
being  of the community,  and to refrain from actions that are detrimental 
to this. Given due weight, the consideration of public interest is 
sufficient to give legitimacy to legislation that may diverge from  the 
exact letter of divine revelation, provided  that one can show that the 
proposed changes serve the common good of the community.   
 
It is in this light that we can consider the legal opinion  (fetwa) which 
Abduh offered in connection with polygamy. He called for  abolishing 
this practice (or  greatly restricting it), and  one of his argument was 
unabashedly utilitarian. According to Abduh,  
 
"…it has become apparent that one of the causes of  injustice and enmity 
between children is the fact that they come from different mothers … For this 
reason it is permissible for the ruler (al-hakim) or those in charge of applying 
the Shari'a  to outlaw  polygamy, as well as the keeping of slave-girls in order 
to protect  family life (Abduh 1972, Pt. 5,  90-95). 
 
Islamic modernist voices of a moderate,  reformist type continue to be 
heard, even now, at a time when conservative and fundamentalist voices 
seem to be at their strongest.  One can mention Yusuf al-Qardawi, who 
believes that thinking, genius, and leadership are  not a monopoly of men 
(Qardawi 1991, 70). He castigates men because  
 
"they are always trying to control women's actions, never giving them a 
chance to express themselves and reveal talents which would enable them to 
assume positions of leadership, independent of men's control." (Qardawi 
1991,  70)  
 
Another author is Muhammad al-Ghazali,  a Muslim writer who has 
traveled in the West, and who  is also aware of the need to present Islam 
in a civilized and contemporary form.  He objects to the "hiding of faces 
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and hands behind veils and gloves, making  women who walk down the 
street look like ghosts", something which Islam, according to him, has 
never mandated (Ghazali 1990,  7). He does not hesitate to quote Amin, 
with whom he agrees in thinking that Islam was the first religion to 
"liberate" women.  Like other reformists before him, Ghazali believes 
that it is religiously permissible for women to work outside the home, 
and he shows  no desire to see  women live  their lives behind closed 
doors. 
 
Still, it must be admitted the many of the modernizing interpreters of 
Islam, the very same people whose writings have served to put women's 
issues on the agenda as far as Muslim societies are concerned, tend to 
run out of steam within a short distance.  For example, Muhammad 
Abduh, who thought it right to disallow polygamy (or greatly restrict it), 
finds it almost "self-evident" that men  will often need to "chastise" 
women: 
 
"That it is sometimes legitimate [for husbands] to beat ["physically 
discipline"] women [their wives] is not  so contrary to reason or common 
sense as to need argument. It is something to which resort must be had at times 
of moral decadence, and in corrupt environments." (Abduh 1972, 208, 212).  
 
 Nor is Muhammad al-Ghazali, writing much later, able to bring himself 
to take a definite stand against "wife-chastisement". All he can do is to 
call for making the chastisement  more symbolic than physical. 
According to Ghazali: 
 
"The consensus of the jurists is that chastisement may be accomplished by the 
man striking the woman with suwak 
2
. The act of beating must not be severe, 
nor  is it permissible for it to reach the area of the face." (Ghazali 1990, 175) 
 
The matter of violence  against women is just one example which shows 
how difficult it must be to break free from traditional ideas which are  
often legitimated by reference to Qur'anic verses and Prophetic custom.   
Other examples can be easily given.   The context in which  Qardawi 
speaks of women assuming positions of leadership refers to areas of work 
that are restricted to women. Notwithstanding his example of the Qur'anic 
Queen of Sheba as an example of "women-leaders", he is  not a supporter 
of  political  equality between men and women.  The same applies to 
occupations: if women are to work  outside the home at all, they are to 
                                                        
2  This is a small piece of branch, small enough to be used as a tooth-pick, which is (in fact) what  pious 
Muslims use  it for, following Prophetic custom.  
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work in occupations that are suitable for their "feminine nature": health 
care, education, medicine, and the like.  
 
In view of the many restrictions which some of  modernists  find it 
reasonable to impose on women, it is may be surprising to accept Barbara 
Stowasser's claim  that  
 
"With some ingenuity, the Modernists  could very well construct  an Islamic  
paradigm on the basis of the Qur'an  which  provides for full equality, 
including equal personal  status rights, if they were to take their method of 
ijtihad and their emphasis on "the public interest" to their logical conclusions." 
(Stowasser 1993, 13) 
 
Of course, Stowasser is  referring to  principles and concepts which the 
modernists sometimes employed,  not  to their actual practice, which 
often fell short from the ideal.   But in order for such Muslim writers to 
"take their method of ijtihad and their emphasis on "the public interest" to 
their logical conclusions" a more self-conscious and clearly articulated 
conception of Islam (or "an" Islam)  is needed,  a conception which these 
writers do not seriously attempt to formulate.   
 
What is needed, I think, is a radical move towards reform,  a move of the 
kind which the  Sudanese author Abdulli an-Na'im calls for.  Following in 
the footsteps  of his teacher,  an-Na'im says 
 
"The basic premise of Ustadh  Mahmoud is that a close examination of the 
content of the Qur'an  and Sunna  reveals two levels  or stages  of the message 
of Islam, one of the earlier Mecca  period, and the other of the subsequent  
Medina  stage. Furthermore, he maintained the earlier  message of Mecca is the 
eternal  and fundamental  message of Islam, emphasizing  the inherent  dignity 
of all human beings, regardless of gender, religious belief, race and so forth. 
That message was characterized  by equality between  men and women and 
complete  freedom  of choice in matters of religion and faith."  (an-Na'im  
1990,  52)
3
  
 
 
 The extant public law of Shari'a, according to an-Na'im and his teacher, 
is based on the Medina stage of Islam. That stage came into being 
"[w]hen that superior level of the [Meccan] message  was violently and 
                                                        
3  By the "Medina stage"  an-Na'im means  the stage which was ushered by the Prophet's migration to 
Medina in 622 A.D. ( the year which marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar).  In Medina  the 
Muslims ceased to be a purely religious community; they became a political community as well.  
Unlike verses of the Qur'an which were revealed during the Meccan period,  Medinese verses tend to 
be rich in legislation  with regard to  marriage, women, inheritance, and other things as well. 
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irrationally  rejected and it was practically  demonstrated that  society at 
large  was not ready  for its implementation."  (an-Na'im 1990, 52)   
 
Ijtihad which takes place within the confines of historical Shari'a has 
inherent limitations, according to an-Na'im.  For it "cannot be exercised 
in matters that are governed by clear and definite texts of the Qur'an and 
Sunna." (an-Na'im 1990, 58)  Such, one may presume,  is the kind of 
ijtihad which Abduh and Ghazali have attempted to exercise.  
 
Regardless of  validity of the descriptions and explanations which an-
Na'im offers of the history of  Islamic jurisprudence, the fact remains that 
he does propose a rationalist, liberal, forward-looking view of Islam 
which is unlikely to face difficulties when it comes to accommodating 
women's rights (or human rights, broadly speaking).  For the essence of 
the "Meccan message"  which an-Na'im wants to use as the ethico-
philosophical basis for a new Shari'a, is something which is universal, 
egalitarian,  and charitable. One can cite the following  Meccan verses in 
support of what an-Na'im claims: 
 
"Say: Come, I will recite what your Lord has forbidden you:  that you 
associate  not anything with Him, and to be good to your parents, and not to 
slay  you children because of poverty; We will provide  you and them; and 
that you approach  not any indecency outward or inward, and that you slay not 
the soul God has forbidden, except by right. That then He has charged you ; 
haply you will understand. And that you approach  not the property of the 
orphan, save  in the fairer  manner, until he is of age. And fill up the measure 
and the balance  with justice.  We charge not any soul  save to its capacity. 
And  when you speak, be just, even if it should be to near kinsman. And fulfill  
God's covenant. That He has charged you; haply will remember."
4
 (6:150-151)  
 
 
Still, the choice to uphold a rational, liberal, and forward-looking  
interpretation of Islam does not by itself show us how to articulate an 
acceptable understanding of gender equality within the Meccan message.   
Somewhat more  helpful  is an-Na'im recommendation for us to argue for 
equality of men and women through a "combination of  contextual 
analysis of the Medinese  texts and invocation of the more fundamental 
Meccan texts." (an-Na'im 1990, 100)  
 
Stated in these terms, this strategy reminds one of what modernizing 
interpreters have all along tried to do: look for "contextualizing"  
                                                        
4 Here and elsewhere I have followed the Arberry translation (Arthur J. Arberry, The Koran 
Interpreted,  London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
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(sociological) reasons which may enable us to suspend, or restrict what 
an-Na'im might call "Medinese licenses",  while at the same time 
invoking the humanitarian and egalitarian messages of the Meccan 
period.  Such writers have always done this without dwelling at great 
length on the Meccan-Medinese distinction, and without using the 
explicitly abolitionist language which an-Na'im uses. 
 
Still, it is not enough to speak broadly of "contextualizing Medinese 
texts" and "invoking more fundamental Meccan texts". We need to 
specify more clearly methods and principles through which these major 
methodological injunctions can be implemented. This is what I would 
like to offer in the remaining sections of this paper.  
 
 
III. A Role for History 
 
To begin to see  how feminist ideas can be conceived within an Islamic  
conceptual framework, we must first come to terms with the fact that 
religious traditions do not completely stand above  history, even when 
their message is of divine origin.  
 
The role which history plays in the evolution of our understanding of 
religion) is very complex.  This role is recognized in the modern-
sounding proposal to "contextualize" religious texts, which an-Na'im 
advocates,  for  "contextualizing" means (in part) understanding revealed 
texts in the light of their historical context.  It is also recognized in  the 
old,  well-established practice of examining  the "occasions of revelation" 
(asbab al-nuzul) in search of meanings, purposes, and guidance with 
respect to the application of  the divine revelation. For the occasions are 
precisely this, namely, historical moments, with specific historical 
conditions of their own, in which religious texts where revealed.  
 
We shall dwell more on the matter of contextuality and the search for 
asbab al-nuzul later in this section. But first we must learn to accept  yet 
another aspect of the role which history plays in conditioning the way we 
understand the faith, and how we live it. What I mean is that purely 
historical developments sometimes force on us  new understandings and 
practices that are (in effect) acts of interpretation, even if they are of a 
somewhat different quality from the interpretations that are made 
voluntarily and in full consciousness.  Two examples can be used to 
illustrate this point.  
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Firstly, there are a number of Qur'anic verses which make the freeing of 
slaves one way of doing penance for  certain  sins or offenses.  One such 
verse is to be found in Sura 5: 
 
"God will not take you to task for a slip in your oaths; but He will take you to 
task for such  bonds as you have made by oath, whereof  the expiation  is to 
feed  ten poor persons with the average of the food you serve to your families, 
or to clothe  them, or set free a slave ; or if any finds not the means, let him 
fast  for three days. That is the expiation of your oaths when you have sworn." 
(5: 89) 
 
It is generally understood, even if apologists do not bother to dwell on 
this point at length, that Islam (like the other two great faiths, Judaism 
and Christianity) did  not outlaw slavery, that verses such as the above, 
presuppose the existence of slavery, and thereby indicate toleration of it.  
This does not mean, of course, that Islam favored slavery in its moral 
code.  (More on this later.) Nevertheless, to own slaves, to buy  them and 
sell them, is not something the Qur'an forbids.  
 
But what are we to do with this verse in this day and age, when our moral 
sensibilities  have developed  to the extent that the practice of slavery is 
judged to be  morally wrong, and has, in fact,  been made illegal? 
 
As the verse indicates,  there used to be a number of ways of doing 
penance for broken oaths. Until fairly recent times, a believer could fulfill  
the divine command in one of four ways, which included the freeing of a 
slave.  But now a believer cannot do that.  One of the four ways has been 
legally banned. This is a historical development  that people have come to 
accept as binding on them, and on  the way they live their religion.  
 
Of course, it could be said that God, in his infinite wisdom, did not 
prescribe one, and only one method of expiation.  But this  is not in 
question. We are not claiming that historical developments have rendered 
false one of the verses in the Qur'an.  What is claimed is simply that 
historical developments have imposed certain restrictions, or 
qualifications on the way God's will can be fulfilled. This argues for the 
historicity of the ways in which we understand and apply divine 
commands: at one time we could live our religion in a certain way, at a 
later stage this is no longer the case. This is a fact of history which shows 
how naïve it is to  think that religion is a simple, unchanging essence that 
is fixed for all times.  
 
A second example  which illustrates the same point has to do with yet 
another now-prohibited practice which Islam allows -- sexual relations 
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between master and slave-girls  --"what your right hand holds", as slave-
girls  are referred to sometimes. According to Qur'an: 
 
"If you fear that you will not act justly  towards the orphans, marry such 
women as seem good to you, two, three, four; but if you fear  you will not be 
equitable, then only one or what your right hand holds, so it is likelier  you 
will not be partial." (4: 3)  
 
Once again we find ourselves dealing with a practice that has been 
superceded by historical developments. It is not possible for a Muslim 
male to own slave-girls, much less have sex with them, in case he is not 
able to take a wife.  
 
When one considers examples of permissions that have been superceded 
by historical developments  that could not have been anticipated in early 
Islam, one finds it easy to imagine that a fate of this kind could have 
befallen the practice of polygamy itself. For as we shall see later, there is 
an  egalitarian ethos in the Qur'an which could have served (it can still 
serve)  to undermine the pro-polygamy position.   Had this happened, 
would we have said that a non-polygamous Muslim society  was in 
violation of God's will? Hardly,  unless  we are prepared  to say that the 
outlawing  of slavery is in opposition to the divine plan for human life.  
But this is not plausible on any reasonable understanding  of Qur'anic 
ethics. 
 
My suggestion is that the way we live our faith,  that is to say, which parts 
of the revelation we apply, and which parts we suspend, which parts we 
emphasize, and which parts we do not emphasize -- all of these things 
amount to an interpretation of  religion.  This is not gainsaid by the fact 
that the historical processes which led to our living the faith  in this  or 
that way were mainly (or to some extent) not under our control.  For 
interpretation is not only (or always)  a matter of giving  new meanings to  
texts: it can also be a matter of suspending, highlighting, or ignoring  
placing emphasis on this text or that.  
 
But this "role for history" which we must accept raises problems which 
we have to deal with. Foremost among these is the problem of  
reconciling  the often clear and unequivocal implications of the "divine 
words" to the new historical realities which seem to have no room for 
these implications.  Slavery is "tolerated" by the Qur'an but is banned by 
law, as well as present-day moral sensibility. Is this  not a contradiction 
of sorts between holy scripture and the real world? 
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On the face of it, there are two, and only two ways to restore order to our 
system of beliefs. Either we say that divine revelations are simply wrong 
in this or that instance which we are concerned with. Or we boldly assert 
that the  historical realities in question  are out of line with the divine will, 
and ought, therefore, to be reversed.  
 
There is no dearth of supporters for the second alternative among present-
day Fundamentalists who, in many ways, live  more in the past than the 
present.  Some of them take  "religious revival" to be  a process whereby 
the present is brought into conformity with the past. It is not improbable 
that some of them may be willing  to accept all the social practices of the 
Islamic past, their logic being that the "later Muslims" cannot possibly be 
superior to the early Muslims.  
 
What about  the option of "finding fault" in the divine revelation? This is 
not possible for  believers who take religion seriously. Secularists, 
atheists, and deists may take this path, believing that religion is 
something of the past, something which modern moral sensibilities and 
scientific knowledge has no room for it.  Sincere Muslims (and believers 
in general) cannot say that.  
 
Are we therefore condemned  either to abrogate  sacred religious texts or  
to compromise  moral convictions which  long, historical (one could say 
"evolutionary") developments have led us to?  I do not think so. There is 
a way out of the difficulty which makes use of the injunction to 
"contextualize", or rely on the "occasions of revelation", which is simply 
one aspect of recognizing  a role for history in the understanding of 
religious texts.   
 
According to Fazlur Rahman, Qur'anic legal pronouncements are usually  
accompanied with a ratio legis which gives the reason for enunciating the 
law  in question.  The ratio legis, in turn, cannot be understood without 
reference to the sociological background of the revelation, which is what 
Qur'anic commentators call " the occasion of revelation". Moreover,  
 
"The ratio legis is the essence of the matter, the actual legislation being its 
embodiment so long as it faithfully and correctly realizes the ratio; if it does 
not, the law has to be changed." (Rahman 1980, 48) 
 
  
Acceptance of  Rahman's view of the role of the ratio legis in the 
application of Qur'an legal enactments provides us with a way of 
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escaping between the horns of dilemma. We neither have to "abrogate" 
revealed enactments, nor to continue to apply them. 
 
The logical  procedure for effecting this escape  has  two steps. Firstly, 
we argue that best way to understand Qur'anic legal enactments  is  to 
view of them as being  implicitly preceded by conditional clauses which 
refer to  the then-existing sociological conditions surrounding the 
"occasion of revelation". According to one author, 
 
"If we consider  Shar`ia commands and judgments  as relative to historical 
circumstances, then we could assume that God  revealed these commands and 
judgments with view to the  social, historical and cultural conditions of the 
Arabs at the time of revelation. In this way the divine commands are to be 
transformed into conditional statements such as: 'If the conditions are of such 
and such a nature, then let the male  inherit twice as much as the female'." 
(Daher 1993, 341)  
 
Secondly (following  Rahman's suggestion),  we argue that the validity of 
divine  legal enactments  is contingent on the continued existence of the 
aforementioned conditions. Should these  undergo major changes, or 
cease to obtain, then the divine commands and prohibitions in question 
cease to be applicable.  
 
To illustrate  this strategy,  consider the Qur'anic verses which legislate 
with respect to women's attire in public places. One such verse says:  
 
"O Prophet, say to thy wives and daughters and the believing  women, that 
they draw  their veils  close to them; so that likelier  they will be known, and 
not hurt." (33: 59)  
 
According to Fatima Mernissi, this verse must be understood in light of 
the conditions which obtained at the time of  revelation.  In the early days 
of Islam, women of unknown or "doubtful status" and position could be  
harassed, propositioned, or otherwise molested in public places. (Mernissi 
1993, 229) In these circumstances veiling must have functioned as a 
"protective measure" against possible harassment in public places. 
(Similar claims are still heard for the virtues of "Islamic dress", which 
allows women greater mobility in public spaces.) 
 
Now, the proposal to interpret this verse as containing implicit reference 
to social and historical circumstances obtaining at  the time of revelation,  
means  that the verse should be taken to mean the following: 
  
"If (or: as long as) social conditions are such that believing women stand to be 
hurt when they go out in  public (on account of their being mistaken for 
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women of "doubtful status"), then they are to wear  covering garments in such 
a way that  they will be easy to distinguish from other women." 
 
According to the present suggestion, the divine enactment contained in 
the consequence-part of the above conditional statement is to be followed  
only as long as the condition which the if-clause formulates holds. Should 
the condition cease to obtain, women will no longer be obliged to wear 
covering garments of the type which conservatives nowadays clamor for.  
 
Mernissi's explanation of the  social-historical context for the veiling 
verses  may not be entirely  convincing. It presupposes that there was a 
great likelihood for  the Prophet's wives, and for other believing women 
to be confused with women of doubtful status, but it does not explain why 
this likelihood existed. Nor does it deal with the seeming injustice of 
legislating for the protection of believing women, as opposed to women 
in general.
5
 Perhaps we need to look deeper for a richer, or more complex 
explanation of the social circumstance of the veiling verses.  
 
Be that as it may, there are other cases where the method of contextual 
explanation can be  applied with greater success. Thus one may seek an 
explanation of the license for men to take more than one wife in terms of  
an attempt to regulate chaotic marital and sexual practices, or  as a 
solution to a problem of relative numbers (of men and women) in society, 
or any number of other ways.  Perhaps the same can be said for Rahman's 
"contextualization" of 2:282, the well-known verse which makes the 
testimony of one man equal to that of two women. According to Rahman, 
 
"The reason for having two female witnesses instead of one male is that 
women would be more "forgetful" than men, since women in those days were 
normally not used to dealing with credit." (Rahman 1980, 48-49)  
 
 
To summarize: the recognition of  a "role for history" allows us to come 
to terms with that the fact that the way we live our faith (our living 
interpretation of the faith, as it were) is an evolutionary outcome of 
social-historical processes  which do not wait upon our individual 
acceptance.  Instead of denying them, we should seek to understand how 
they came  about.  Furthermore, the recognition of a role for history 
enables us to take (at least partial ) control of processes which lead to new 
understandings of faith.  As we  proceed to contextualize  religious texts, 
                                                        
5  I am indebted to anonymous reader of this  journal for these points.  
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we are freed somewhat from the rigid constraints of traditions, and  we 
are left free to explore new and more workable models of religiosity.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that  the injunction to "pay 
attention to history" does not  by itself yield feminism (Islamic or other), 
nor does it  necessarily entail a social-political-moral order than can lay 
claim to universality and rationality.  History  has many uses, and the 
uses to which it can be put clearly depend on  one's philosophy in general, 
and  on one's philosophy of religion in particular. In the next two sections 
we shall see how a "historical view" of religion needs to be supplemented 
with other intellectual principles in order for the move towards Islamic 
feminism  to be possible. 
 
IV. Ijtihad as Rational Faith 
 
Most students of religion will agree that religion as such embodies an 
irreducible element of unquestioning faith, something which is not based 
on empirical evidence or rational argument. If religion in all its aspects 
were based on rational evidence then we would have a hard time 
distinguishing a system of religious beliefs from a system of scientific 
(mathematical or philosophical) beliefs which have little or no room for 
faith.  
 
But to admit the presence of the non-rational (notice we do not say the 
"irrational") or that which is not  in evidence (notice we do not say "that 
which has been disproved") does not by itself tell us much about the role 
which rationality, science, and evidence may be allowed to play in 
religious life.  
 
Undoubtedly, religious practice can, and will, differ from age to age, and 
equally undoubtedly,  rationality is one of the dimensions along which it 
can vary. Religious beliefs may be held and practiced in a more or less 
rational manner, or they may be held and practiced in a more or less anti-
rational manner.  
 
Of course, we need to say what we mean by "rational". Now this is a term 
that has different meanings, which we do not need to discuss here.
6
 What 
we can do in a brief space is  to give an idea of what we mean by 
exercising ijtihad within the framework of a "rational faith", which is 
what we claim is needed in order to establish a ground for  Islamic 
feminism. 
                                                        
6 See  M. Stenmark  (1995, 20-33) for a  discussion of various meanings of rationality. 
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The idea behind speaking of "ijtihad as rational faith"  is to view ijtihad 
as a relational process which involves human beings, their constantly 
evolving social needs and circumstances, and (lastly) divine will viewed 
as "rational". The first two elements need little or no explanation, but the 
last  is certainly problematic.  So what does it mean to view divine will as 
rational?  
 
In the present context, "rational" does not merely means "able to 
understand and determine relations between means and ends", a 
definition which would allow an evil serial murderer to be "rational". 
"Rational" as used here  means additionally "that which we can more or 
less understand, that which is reasonable".  On our use,  rationality 
entails goodness, for someone who does harm for no good reason, or for 
no reason at all, is not a "reasonable person", though he or she may be 
rational in the more technical sense of being able to "calculate" or reckon 
with means and ends
7
. 
 
To view divine will as rational is thus to say that God is both 
"reasonable" and "good".  This is something which, I believe, we have to 
accept anyway,  regardless of the use which we intend to make of it in the 
context of seeking grounds for Islamic feminism. For even if we  were to 
admit that God is far "above" our understanding,  we  must  still attribute 
goodness to God.  On no proper understanding of what religion is all 
about is it possible to withhold attributing goodness to God. There is 
another entity  to which evil may be freely attributed: it is called "the 
devil", as we all know.   
 
But what does God's goodness entail, on the theological view presented 
here? Not only that God wills nothing but  what is good for humans,  but 
also that the ultimate justification of divine commands and prohibitions 
must ( in all  or most cases) make reference to human interests and 
welfare. 
 
Now the idea that divine will is good encourages one to introduce into the 
process of ijtihad  a distinction between the  essential divine purposes and 
designs on the one hand, and any number of  historically specific rules 
and judgments which were intended to serve the  essential purposes and 
                                                        
7 What is "good"?  This is hardly a simple question. But this is not the place to discuss it. Nothing in 
the present argument hinges on a detailed  ethical theory about  what "the good" is. For our purposes it 
is sufficient to have agreement  (presupposed in this paper) on the idea that equality between men and 
women (suitably defined) is  "good",  that feminism, to the extent  that it embodies this demand, is 
"good".  
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designs.  According  to al-Taher al-Haddad, a Tunisian advocate of 
women's rights who wrote in the 1920s, one must distinguish between 
"the essence of Islam" and certain practices which Islam had to 
compromise about, given "the firmly established ways" of the pre-Islamic 
Arabs (which could not be changed all at once): 
 
"We must take into consideration the following  important distinction. On the 
one hand,  there is  the message of Islam, which is its essence,  its meaning. It 
remains eternal,  just as the belief in the unity of God, the perfection of morals, 
the establishment of justice and  equality between people, and  everything that 
follows from these essentials.  On the other hand, we  have the contingent 
circumstances, and the firmly established ways of thinking that were to be 
found among pre-Islamic Arabs. These  latter were not among the things 
which Islam aimed at. Hence every rule, regulation,  or modification that 
Islam laid for these contingent matters remains as long as these matters 
remain. And if they cease,  then their [Qur'anic] judgement ceases with them.  
And there in nothing in all of this which negatively reflects on Islam. This 
applies to such matters as slavery,  slave-girls, polygamy, and the like, matters 
which cannot  even be considered to be part of Islam. (al-Haddad 1992, 21) 
 
 
Al-Haddad may be  criticized for presenting an overly simple  view of 
Islam, reducing it to belief in the unity of God,  the perfection of morals, 
and the establishment of justice.  Still, an attempt to steer religious 
interpretation in the direction that al-Haddad envisions need not mean 
ignorance of the rich complexity of Islamic ideas and  history.  Perhaps 
Rahman hits the mark better with his more guarded statement, according 
to which we have to distinguish between legal enactments and moral 
injunctions when we try to understand  Qur'anic social reforms. 
According to Rahman:  
 
"Only by so distinguishing  can we not only understand the true orientation of 
the Qur'an but also solve  certain knotty  problems  with regard, for example, 
to women's reform. This is where the Muslim legal tradition, which essentially  
regarded  the Qur'an as a law book and not the religious source of law, went so 
palpably wrong."  (Rahman 1980, 47) 
 
 
Assuming  that we are permitted to impart to Islam the kind of inflection 
which al-Haddad  and Rahman, in their different ways, want to impart to 
it, the question arises as to the  use that can made of  it insofar  as modern 
ijtihad is concerned.  Consider, for purposes of illustration, the practice of 
violence against women, often referred to euphemistically as "wife-
chastisement".  Now,  if we take seriously the idea that Islam is basically 
belief in the unity of God, the perfection of morals, and the establishment 
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of justice and equality between people (which means men and women); if 
we remember that the victory of Islam over pre-Islamic customs meant 
(among other things) abolishing the custom of female infanticide, in 
addition to granting property rights to women -- if we consider all of 
these things, what can we possibly  say about a supposed right of 
husbands to "discipline" wives? 
 
There is, of course, the well-known Qur'anic verse which says: 
 
"And those you fear may be rebellious admonish, banish them to their 
couches, and  beat them. If they obey you, look not  for any way against 
them." (4: 34)  
 
But this verse must be placed in the historical context of a people who did 
not truly know what domestic violence means, what its effects are, or the 
moral injustice which it represents.  It must also be seen as part of a 
religion whose victory, on the whole, represented an overall improvement 
in women's conditions.  Female infanticide was abolished,  restrictions 
were placed on polygyny, certain forms of sexual exploitation were 
eliminated,  and women gained property rights. Perhaps it was not  
possible for Islam under the then-existing  circumstances to ask men to 
recognize women as equals.  Perhaps it would not have made sense for 
God to ask men to give up all forms of power over women at that time.  
After all, what religion,  or society, could do these things fifteen centuries 
ago, when men did not even recognize the humanity of other men?  But 
the Qur'an points clearly in the direction of a higher morality than existed 
at the time. And it  not clear why we should stop at the stage of early 
Islam, why a modern rational ijtihad  cannot take us further in the 
direction pointed to by the Qur'an itself.  
 
It is not to be expected that conservative thinkers will have much 
sympathy with this attempt to inject rationality into religion. Many of 
them wonder about the limits  to which one may go  in attempting  to 
"rationalize" religion.
8
  These thinkers are often joined by anthropologists 
who  remind us that we must in the end defer to the  ordinary believer's 
point of view when it comes to understanding what religion says (Horton 
1982, 209); that it is not accurate on our part to present religion in terms 
                                                        
8 Adel Daher, whom we quoted earlier, formulates a concept of "the doctrinal essence of Islam." This 
doctrinal essence   is summarized by these words: "Belief in a unitary, omnipresent eternal creator, all-
knowing, and all-good, absolutely free, and a source of moral obligation." (Daher 1993, 2)  Islam, in 
this abstract guise, is identical with Deism, the religion of the Enlightenment. It is not clear  how this 
doctrinal essence differs from the one which can be attributed to Christianity or Judaism.  
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of  "softened  modernist  re-interpretations" which are not freely 
expressed by ordinary believers (Gellner 1992, 4). 
 
This type of argument, however, is not convincing.  It falls apart when we 
realize that there is usually more than one point of view for  those who 
believe in religion.  Religion  has  always been (and will always  probably 
be)  a contested field of meaning.  For example, there have always been 
liberal, open-minded, progressive points of view, as well  conservative, 
literal, "reactionary" points of view.  All of these  points of views are part 
of religion, viewed as continuing historical  process that exists in many 
places. Contrary to what some would have us believe, legitimacy is not a 
monopoly of this or that point of view, specially that which lays claim to 
either popularity or antiquity.   
 
 Therefore there is no call for the "rationalist" party to abandon the field 
of battle over what Islam means, on the ground that "this is not how it is 
usually interpreted". What is usually the case need not always be the case. 
Rational  ijtihad is not without  powerful and compelling arguments.   On 
the contrary, it has all the power which rationality and common sense 
bring with them, even when the incoherent voices of the multitude seem 
to drown all else.   
 
V. Gender-conscious Ijtihad 
 
So far we have discussed two methodological requirements  that are 
needed in order to make Islamic feminism possible, at least as an 
intellectual project, if nothing more.  
 
The two requirements are related to each other in the following way. 
Historical-minded ijtihad  reconciles us  to the fact of change when it 
comes to the way we understand and live our faith.  Next, we  look for 
ways to preserve that which seems worth preserving, and to lay to rest 
that which deserves to be laid to rest.  But how is this to be carried out? 
This brings into play the second methodological requirement of  
practicing ijtihad as rational faith. This requires, at a minimum,  that  life 
must not be lived in opposition to reason and common sense.  
 
Still, these two methodological requirements are not by themselves 
sufficient to yield a position that can be characterized as feminist.  They 
are  indeed necessary conditions, for without them it is difficult to see 
how feminist work can be done within the bounds of religion. But there is 
nothing in them which guarantees that religious interpretation will 
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represent women's point of view. This brings us to the third and last 
methodological principle which we want to discuss.  
 
The basic idea behind "gender-conscious ijtihad"  is to bring out the 
relevance of gender to the interpretation of religious texts  and  the 
elaboration  of ethical insights which they embody. Hitherto such 
tasks have been the exclusive domain of men, who  often proceeded  
to fashion God in a masculinist image that could be relied on to serve 
and protect their interests. The challenge which an Islamic feminism 
faces is  to go over the  religious texts and traditions with the intention 
of reclaiming at least part of them  for women.  
 
One Islamic feminist writer who hints at the possibility of injecting a 
gender-conscious perspective into Islamic studies is the Moroccan 
Farida Banani. In her book Taqseem al-'Amal baina al-Rajul wal-
Mar`ah (Division of labor between men and women), she states that  
ijtihad is a "reading" of religious texts, and that that all readings are 
not innocent. She does not  explicitly say that gender is one of the 
variables that need to be taken into account in the reading of religious 
texts. But the extension of her meaning in that direction is both easy 
and legitimate. According to Banani: 
 
 
"If we accept the idea that  jurisprudence … is simply an effort to 
understand the Shari'a and to interpret it,  then it follows that that one 
should be able to question [jurisprudence], since it is a human effort, a 
product of the human mind. … No reading of  a religious text is an 
innocent reading. This is what many Muslim jurists admit in their writings. 
We find many of them saying,  either in the introduction to their work, or 
in the conclusion, that their efforts of interpretation are their own 
individual efforts, and should not be taken as being "the"  true 
interpretation of Islam…" (Banani 1993, 23)  
 
Now the idea that people  may have vested interests which can 
influence their understanding (an idea which must  be elaborated so as 
to include gender as one of the relevant variables) is by no means 
foreign to Qur'an. There are verses which  testify that human beings 
are inclined to believe (or disbelieve) in accordance what pleases them 
or serves their interests. For example, in Sura 5, the Children of Israel 
are castigated in these terms:  
 
"And we took compact with the Children of Israel, and We sent 
Messengers to them. Whensoever  there came to them a Messenger with 
that their souls had not desire for, some they cried lies to, and  some they 
slew." (5: 70) 
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One can also cite the famous episode of the "Satanic Verses,"  which 
acknowledge pre-Islamic  deities, and which, according to tradition, 
Satan put in the mouth of  the Prophet. According to the tradition, this 
episode took place during a time when the Prophet had an intense 
desire for his people to accept the new religion.  Recognizing the 
influence which "fancy" has on the Prophet's  mind, the Qur'an says:  
 
"We sent not ever any Messenger or Prophet before thee, but that Satan 
cast into his fancy, when he was fancying; but God annuls what Satan 
casts, then God confirms His signs."(22: 50) 
 
 
 And so it was that the Prophet uttered  verses which were  sure to 
please his pagan compatriots, only because he wished so much for 
them to believe his message.  Such is the power of subjective 
inclination! 
 
Now if human beings are liable to let their  interests and wishes affect 
their judgment, as the Qur'an acknowledges,  it  is not inconceivable 
that the placing of  the practice  of ijtihad entirely in the hands of men 
will lead to conclusions that systematically favor men, or fail to give 
due weight to women's interests. 
 
Obviously, Islamic feminists can pursue this line of thought, and  in so 
doing they would still be on Islamic grounds. Consider the example of 
polygamy.  As Laila Ahmad makes clear in her paper "Early Islam 
and the position of women: the problem of interpretation",  the 
Qur'anic verses which bear on polygamy, taken as a whole,  provide a 
strong basis for an argument which outlaws (or greatly restricts) 
polygamy.  One is the verse quoted in the preceding section, which 
says  in part "…but if you fear  you will not be equitable, then only 
one"  (4: 3), and another which categorically states: "You will not be 
able to be equitable between women, be you so eager." (4: 129) 
 
Laila Ahmad's discussion raises the  question of why society failed to 
place restrictions on polygamy, or to lay out  socially determinable 
standards and criteria of fairness, in cases where polygamy is permitted. 
This is a matter of great consequence as far as Ahmad is concerned,  for 
 
“[t]he legal base of marriage and of polygyny  would differ profoundly  
depending on whether  the ethical injunction  to treat wives  impartially  was 
judged  to be  a matter of legislation  or left purely to individual man’s 
conscience.” (Ahmad 1991, 59) 
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Islamic feminists can ask why this did not happen, why the "ethical 
egalitarianism" found in various place in the Qur'an, was not heeded 
when it came to relations between men and women.   The question can 
be reasonably answered by reference  to biases based  on men's 
monopoly of the power engendered  and sustained by their specialized  
knowledge  of  ijtihad. If Islamic feminists were to say this, they 
would not be far off the mark.  
 
Of course,  the historical fact of polygamy is not solely a matter of  
what religious texts say,  nor  is it solely a question of who interprets 
them, and how. It goes without saying that economic and other 
material variables are relevant to this historical fact.  But  one should 
certainly not underestimate the role of religion as a cultural 
determinant, nor should one think that it is a matter of indifference 
who has a monopoly over matters of interpretation.  
 
It is not implausible to think that if  Muslim women had a voice in 
how religious texts are to be understood and applied, then an opinion 
might have formed which says that polygamy is not ultimately in 
conformity with the divine will, or (at least) that  it is consistent with 
divine will that  society should gradually evolve towards the 
elimination of this practice.  
 
The example which we have taken from Ahmad's work  clearly 
illustrates  the irreplaceable contribution which a gender-conscious 
ijtihad stands to make.  For the texts which provide scriptural 
justification for imposing social and legal restrictions on the practice 
of polygamy (and may eventually allow society to grow out of it) have 
always been there, with no one to make use of them.  It is too 
idealistic and simple-minded to believe than male mujtahids will want 
to draw the  conclusions that can be drawn from them.  The marriage 
institution, with all its restrictions and licenses, has for ages reflected 
power-relations  in men's favor.  Male mujtahids are part of the system 
of  these power relations. The service which they perform often 
reflects itself in a failure to put into sharp relief aspects of the Shari'a 
legislation which can be used to undermine these power relations.  
 
Giving voice to that which has been passed over in silence by male 
mujtahids is not the only task which a gender-conscious method of 
ijtihad can carry out.  It can also offer a "re-reading" of the texts; it 
can search for alternative interpretations and  neglected possible 
meanings.   
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Some examples will make this clear. One can mention Farida Banani's 
discussion of   the   Qur'anic notion of  “qiwamah”: “[Men have 
qiwamah over women], for that God has preferred in bounty one of 
them over another, and for that they have expended  of their property.” 
(4:34)   Banani derives  “qiwamah” from an Arabic root which means 
"to take care of,  to serve, to protect", rather than  "to lead, to preside 
over, to manage".  (Banani 1993, 35)  
 
Another example can be found in the writings  of Zainab al-Ma'adi.  She 
suggests a distinction between that which  “holy”, or  “sacred”,  and that 
which is “cultural”.  The former includes everything which is "definitely" 
stated in the Qur'an, leaving no room for interpretation, or diversity of 
opinion.  Everything else, by implication,  falls in the realm of the 
"cultural", something which humans are free to change according to their  
changing circumstances.  The author searches the Qur'an for verses that 
clearly say that women must not work outside the home, and finds 
nothing to justify this opinion.  Therefore she relegates the verdict against 
women’s work (popular among conservative jurists) to the cultural realm,  
where  it can have no binding force on Muslims. (Ma'adi 1992, 79-91)  
 
Finally, it is interesting to look at the feminist  meaning which Khadijah 
Sabbar  injects into the concept  of  “infaq”, which means “providing for 
the home”.  Being  “provider for the home” is the basis for the supposed 
“leadership” role which  husbands  have, in accordance with  the usual 
interpretation of  4: 34.  Sabbar does not contest the interpretation of 
“qiwamah”, as Banani does.  But she insists  that  “providing for the 
home” is  not simply a matter of the monthly salary which the husband 
brings home.  It includes such tasks as helping with  the housework, 
spending time with children, etc. (Sabbar 1992, 33). To her such things 
are part of  "infaq". This thought is not  likely to cross the mind of a male 
jurist, but  it is made possible when ijtihad is approached from a gender-
conscious perspective.  
 
These are only some of the interesting "turns" which Islamic feminism 
stands to give to familiar verses and traditions which have  been thought 
for a long time to favor men.  There  are others  which await being 
discovered by interpreters who approach the work of ijtihad from a 
feminist point of view.  
 
 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
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The aim of this paper has been to argue that it is not impossible for one to 
entertain feminist ideas within an Islamic conceptual framework. A 
number of conceptually necessary conditions are needed for this, which 
can be summarized by saying that one needs to think about Islam 
historically, rationally, and in a gender-conscious manner.  
 
Suppose we were able to effect a  conceptual revolution in the way Islam 
is understood, a revolution that complied with the requirements of 
historicity, rationality, and gender: would that justify us in speaking of 
"Islamic feminism"?   
 
This is bound to be a controversial question.  From one side of the divide 
some will say that what is referred to as "Islamic feminism" is not truly 
Islamic, because it violates major precepts of Islamicity, as indicated by 
suspension or abrogation of many licenses that are granted by the Qur'an.  
From the other side of the divide, some will say that no feminism can 
remain within the bound of religion, that any self-respecting feminism 
must reject religion and the understanding of spirituality that is associated 
with it.
9
  
 
But this is hardly surprising. For we have known all along that Islam is 
not the same to all interpreters, and that feminism is not the same to all 
those who advocate it. There is a wide range of  understandings in both 
fields of meanings, and it is somewhere towards the middle that I have 
sought to find room for  Islamic feminism. 
 
My purpose  has not been to argue that this or that specific conception of 
Islam or feminism is true.  This is a large task which I am not equipped to 
carry out.  Rather, what I wanted to accomplish is to chart  out a  possible 
meeting place for  people  who want to argue for women's rights within 
an Islamic framework of thought, as well as people who are prepared to 
view religion from a gender-sensitive point of view.  More work needs to 
be done in order to create a common vocabulary, and to produce 
intellectual innovations that are true to the present while not betraying the 
past of Muslim societies. □ 
                                                        
9 This is evident from the radical  feminist critiques of  some of the major concepts that appear in 
religion and philosophy-- concepts such as "matter", "spirit", "mind", "reason", "God", etc.  Leaving 
aside  specific androcentric items of legislation which can be found in most or all religions,  many 
feminists make the further claim that  concepts we have just mentioned  are thoroughly pervaded with 
gender bias.  See, for example,  Hein (1996) and Lloyd (1996). It is not likely such critiques will leave 
any religion recognizably the same.  
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